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Abstract
The Vancouver Composite Index fell by over 25% in less than six weeks during spring 1997
as the junior mining sector collapsed.  We argue that this market collapse was triggered by
the failure of Bre-X Minerals when that company’s Indonesian claims, previously believed
to contain the world’s largest gold deposit, were shown to be pure fraud.  Our event study,
based on market returns for the Vancouver Composite Index and for a portfolio of 59 gold
stocks, shows the effects of the Bre-X scandal to be both sizeable and significant.  There is
also some evidence that smaller exploration companies were hardest hit.
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Fraud and Financial Markets: The 1997 Collapse of the Junior Mining Stocks
One plan of acquiring sudden wealth was to “salt” a wildcat claim and sell out while the
excitement was up.  The process was simple.  The schemer located a worthless ledge, sunk a
shaft on it, bought a wagon-load of rich “Comstock” ore, dumped a portion of it into the
shaft and piled the rest by its side above-ground.  Then he showed the property to a
simpleton and sold it to him at a high figure.
(Twain, 1913, pp. 21-22)
For the mining industry, where salting is viewed as the stratagem of scoundrels, Bre-X was a
mammoth embarrassment, not only because it overshadowed the good work carried out by
honest geologists and engineers, but because it had become one scam too many.  Mining,
particularly junior mining, is an industry that needs public support to survive.  The trust built
up over decades by honest mining men had been undermined too often ... Enough had
become enough.
(Danielson and Whyte, 1997, p. 9)
1.  Introduction
While 1997 was a very good year for most major Canadian and US stock market indices, it was a
disastrous year for investors in Canadian junior mining stocks.  The Composite Index of the Vancouver Stock
Exchange, home to most smaller mining companies, collapsed in the spring of 1997 falling by more than 25%
in less than six weeks.  Interestingly, while this crash predated the major weakness in gold prices that set in
later in 1997, its onset coincides precisely with the well-publicized failure of a mining company known as
Bre-X.  Bre-X rose from a minor penny stock to a company with a market cap of more than 6 billion
Canadian dollars on the strength of a reputedly-enormous gold deposit in Indonesia.  It is hardly surprising
that, when it became clear that the company’s claims were fraudulent, Bre-X stock plunged in value.  What is
more remarkable is the way that Bre-X seemed to carry the whole junior mining market with it.  On March
20, 1997, just prior to the first reports that independent tests did not confirm Bre-X company claims, the
Vancouver Composite Index stood at 1307.99.  By May 5, 1997, when Strathcona Mining Services Ltd. -- an2
independent consulting firm hired to assess the veracity of Bre-X’s findings -- issued its final report
concluding that the Bre-X claims were a fraud “without precedent in mining history,” the index had fallen to
1003.53.
1
In this paper, we address the impact of the Bre-X factor on a sample of 59 gold mining companies. 
These companies range from behemoths like Barrick Gold with numerous operating mines to smaller, junior
companies with no production that are valued solely for the potential success of their exploration activities. 
We show that not only does news of the Bre-X fraud significantly lower excess returns across the board but
also there is some evidence that the negative effects are  higher for junior mining companies.  We cannot be
sure whether these market declines reflected a collapse of confidence in all exploration companies, fears that
other junior companies were as fraudulent as Bre-X, forced selling to make good losses and/or margin calls
on Bre-X holdings, or some combination of all these things.  However, the massively negative impact is clear.
 The results show how important reputation and full disclosure can be to asset markets where prices are based
on high-value, low probability events.
2.  The Bre-X Fraud, the Gold Price and Mining Stock Prices
Previous research has concluded that gold mining stocks are highly sensitive to gold price
movements.  Blose and Shieh (1995) find a gold price elasticity significantly greater than one.  Tufano (1998)
derives an average elasticity of two, but also notes that this average is subject to considerable variation across
time and across firms.  Tufano’s results also indicate that firms with larger reserves, larger production, and
larger market values are more sensitive to changes in gold prices.  The common equity of junior gold mining
stocks with few or any proven reserves is rather like an out of the money option.  With a small probability of
finding a large amount of gold that is economically feasible to mine, the value of the option is likely to be
more sensitive to changes in the probability of finding a minable deposit than it is to changes in the gold
price. Take, for example, Bre-X prior to its claims of a massive gold deposit at “Busang” in Indonesia.  The3
only reason that the stock had a positive value in the pre-Busang days was the hope that the company would
be able to find gold or other valuable mineral deposits before it ran out of money.  Were the company to find
such a deposit, the stock price stood to rise substantially regardless of the then current gold price. While none
of this is meant to imply that gold prices are irrelevant to junior mining stocks, it does indicate that such
stocks are also sensitive to  investor perceptions of the chances of “hitting the mother lode” with their
exploration activities.
Before the Bre-X fraud was unearthed, Bre-X stock rose from pennies per share in 1994 to 201.75
Canadian dollars on May 10, 1996 when shareholders approved a 10-for-1 stock split.  Early shareholders
selling at peak valuations after the stock split stood a to enjoy a more than 500 fold profit.  This rise reflected
ever expanding estimates of the size of the company’s Busang gold deposit based on assays taken from the
company’s drill samples.  By May 1997, however, Bre-X stock reverted to pennies and ceased trading when
these drill samples were found to have been “salted” by gold added to the rock samples after they had been
taken out of the ground.  While the methods were sophisticated enough to fool many mining analysts who
recommended purchase of Bre-X shares, the fraud came to light after Freeport-McMoran sought independent
confirmation of Bre-X company drill results before proceeding with their planned joint venture with Bre-X. 
Under the deal announced on February 17, 1997, Freeport was to operate the mine and fund mine
development in return for a 15% share of the pie, leaving Bre-X with 45% and various Indonesian interests
with the remainder.
2  But when neither Freeport nor independent consultants Strathcona was able to confirm
the existence of an economically-significant gold deposit of any kind on Busang -- let alone an enormous
deposit that Bre-X officials had claimed might run to 200 hundred million ounces of gold -- the salting fraud
was uncovered, the deal was null and void, and Bre-X and their remaining shareholders were left with 100%
of nothing.
The meteoric rise of Bre-X stock in 1995-1996 had been accompanied by a similar run-up in the
junior company Diamond Fields that discovered an enormous -- and genuine -- nickel deposit in4
Newfoundland’s Voisey’s Bay.  Diamond Fields eventually was bought out by major nickel producer Inco for
4.5 billion Canadian dollars in August 1996.  In the same month, Arequipa completed another rags to riches
story when it was bought out by Barrick Gold for 1.1 billion Canadian dollars on the strength of Arequipa’s
drill results on its ?Pierina? gold deposit in Peru.  As with Bre-X, these drill results had not even yet been
confirmed by an independent feasibility study.
3  Besides rapidly enriching Diamond Fields and Arequipa
shareholders, these strikes undoubtedly helped fuel investor interest in the junior mining sector in general.  As
interest in Bre-X itself reached fever pitch in 1996, junior company after junior company sought ?contracts
of work? from the Indonesian government so that they could look for a Bre-X-type deposit of their own. 
Indeed, former Diamond Fields Chairman Robert Friedland himself founded such a company, Indochina
Goldfields, to explore for gold near Bre-X’s Busang property.  Investor interest was such that he was quickly
able to raise $200 million dollars for this venture in June 1996 (Francis, 1997, p. 101).  Before the Bre-X
collapse, the junior mining sector was riding a wave of optimism about the prospects of finding more large
mineral deposits.
It is important to note that most companies participating in this Indonesia ?land rush? had no
proven reserves at all, but merely land acreage that they planned to explore in the hope of discovering
something valuable under the surface.  Their share prices accordingly rose on the basis of their potential for
future success rather than reflecting any actual claim on known gold reserves.  If confidence in this potential
were to collapse, there would be little or nothing to support the value of the stock.  Hence the vulnerability of
this sector to the effect of the Bre-X fraud in lowering confidence not only in companies involved in Indonesia
but also in those exploring elsewhere.
4  Indeed, just two weeks after Strathcona’s final report applied the
coup de grace to Bre-X, shareholders in another junior company, Delgratia, learned that they were the
victims of a salting scam in Nevada.   Even positive drill results were now likely to greeted with considerable
scepticism.  And lack of investor interest meant increased difficulty in funding exploration, which in turn5
meant less chance for the company to find something that could boost the stock price, in turn leading
shareholders to sell now ...  The continued decline in the Vancouver market index in the year and a half
following the Bre-X scandal, while certainly not helped by the weak price of gold, may well also reflect an
enduring vicious circle of this type.
3.  Testing the Importance of the Bre-X Effect
A. The Sample
We begin by documenting the overall effect of the Bre-X debacle on the Vancouver Stock Exchange
(VSE) Composite Index, probably the most readily-available proxy for the universe of junior mining stocks. 
While the VSE has expanded to include technology companies in recent years, the majority of listed firms are
still natural resource firms.  It is important to note that the VSE bills itself as a “venture capital marketplace”
and as a home to companies that are unable to meet the listing requirements of exchanges specializing in
more established companies.  The exchange has historically listed junior mining and natural resource
exploration companies with claims located throughout the world.  After controlling for gold price movements,
there is a striking, and statistically significant, correlation between dips in the index and the release of
negative news about Bre-X. 
We then turn to a portfolio of individual gold mining companies for which returns data was available.
 We are handicapped here in that financial information on the very smallest firms that stood to suffer most
from the Bre-X scandal was either non-existent or not readily available from standard sources.  We did,
however, compile a sample of 59 firms ranging from large, established gold producers like Barrick and Placer
Dome to junior mining firms, 18 of which at least had no proven reserves.  The firms are weighted equally in
the creation of the portfolio in order to prevent the large firms from dominating the returns.
To be included in the sample the firm had to: (i) be included in Compustat with a Primary SIC Code
of 1020 (Gold/Precious Metals Mining) or SIC Code 1060 (Metals Mining) and prove to be primarily6
involved in exploring for and/or mining gold, (ii) have stock price returns available from the web site of
“Canada Stockwatch,” and (iii) have an annual report or 10-K statement available for the fiscal year ended
prior to the Bre-X scandal.  The 59 firms are detailed in Table 1, which includes each firm’s proven reserves
and yearly gold production as reflected in financial information available at the time of the Bre-X debacle in
spring 1997.  Information contained in the financial statements allows us to classify firms into different
groups based on reserve levels, production amounts, and reserve location.  We test for significant differences
between the effects on large firms vs. small firms and for differential effects on firms with assets only in
Australia, Europe and North American vs. those with assets in less developed countries (LDCs).
B. Methodology and the Choice of Event Dates
We employ the standard event study methodology and use a multifactor market model that includes
the daily gold price return.  As in Tufano (1998) we use the daily closing spot gold prices from the COMEX
exchange which closes at 2:30 P.M. Eastern Time, earlier than the closing times of the security exchanges.  In
addition, many of the smaller firms in our sample trade infrequently, producing potential  non-synchronous
trading problems in some of the smaller portfolios used in our analysis.  We use the approach of Dimson
(1979) and Fowler and Rorke (1983) to correct for such problems in our estimation of the effects of the Bre-
X fraud on the market value of other mining firms.
5  The model for our 59 firm portfolio and the Vancouver
Stock Exchange portfolio is as follows:
Rpt = ap + b1pt Rmt+ b2pt Rmt-1 + b3pt Rmt+1 + b4pt Rgt + b5pt Rgt-1 + b6pt Rgt+1 + et       (1)
where Rpt is the return on the portfolio, Rmt, Rmt-1 , Rmt+1, and Rgt , Rgt-1 , Rgt+1 are the current period, one
period lagged, and one period lead daily returns from the S&P 500 and the spot gold price, and et is a white-
noise error term.
6   The daily closing values for the S&P 500 and the gold price were obtained via the internet
from “Quote.com.”
The choice of the Bre-X event dates is not straightforward.  The first hint that something was amiss
at Bre-X came on March 19, 1997, when Michael De Guzman, Bre-X’s chief geologist at the Busang site,7
was reported to have “fallen” from a helicopter en route to the Busang property.  On March 21, an Indonesian
paper announced that Freeport-McMoran’s tests appeared to contradict Bre-X’s assay results.  On March 26,
Bre-X announced that the potential reserves at Busang may have been “overstated” and that independent
consulting firm Strathcona had been hired to review the results.  In a separate statement, Freeport-McMoran
announced that they had been unable to confirm the assays from Bre-X’s drill cores.  On March 27 Freeport
released full assay results that were fundamentally inconsistent with Bre-X’s claims.  Shares of Bre-X were
not traded on March 26 but lost approximately 84% of their value on March 27.  We use March 26, 1997 as
event day zero with the recognition that, while much of the important information did not reach the market
until March 27,  some information was available earlier.
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C. Empirical Findings
The model given by equation (1) above is estimated for the -140 to +140 day interval surrounding
the event window, excluding day zero and the forty day window surrounding the event.  The following results
are obtained for the Vancouver Composite Index and the 59 firm portfolio:
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RVCI    =  -0.0013 + 0.1164Rmt + -0.0677Rmt-1 + 0.0664Rmt+1 + 0.1728Rgt + 0.1428Rgt-1 + 0.3219Rgt+1     (2)
              (-2.13)**  (1.78)*        (-1.02)          (1.01)        (1.69)*        (1.39)         (3.15)***
R59 firms =  0.0010 + 0.0112Rmt + 0.0040Rmt-1 + 0.1283Rmt+1 + 0.8325Rgt + 0.0046Rgt-1 + 0.8332Rgt+1       (3)
               (1.27)     (0.13)           (0.05)         (1.45)     (6.07)***     (0.03)       (6.07)***
where t-statistics are in parentheses and *, **, and ***  denote significance at the 10%, 5 %, and 1% levels,
respectively.  As with Tufano (1998) gold price movements play a more significant role in the movement of
gold stocks than does the market portfolio represented by the S&P 500.  The total effect of gold price
changes on returns on the Vancouver Index is 0.6375 and the total effect on the 59 firm portfolio is 1.6703. 
Stronger gold price effects on the 59 form portfolio are to be expected since all 59 are gold stocks whereas8
the Vancouver Index includes non-gold stocks.  The total gold price effect on the 59 firm portfolio is in line
with Blose and Shieh’s (1995) and Tufano’s (1998) findings of a gold price elasticity greater than one.
Table 2 presents abnormal and cumulative abnormal daily returns (CARs) associated with the event.
 The Vancouver index and our 59 firm portfolio both experience negative abnormal returns for the period
March 19 - March 21 --  which includes De Guzman’s death and the rumors about Freeport-McMoran’s
negative findings as reported in the Indonesian press.  The abnormal returns are negative for both portfolios
on March 26 and the cumulative abnormal returns are –1.53% (t-value = 1.62) and –3.21% (t-value = 2.45). 
On March 27, the day Bre-X lost 84% of its market value, both the index and the portfolio drop significantly
by over 4.0%.  The value of the index and the portfolio continue to fall over the event window in the face of
further rumors and accusations of fraud and lack of gold at Busang.   The CARs for day +20 are –11.56%
and –18.70%, which are very large decreases.  The Bre-X fraud did have a significant effect on other gold
mining firms.  On May 5, the day of the final Strathcona report confirming only trace amounts of gold at
Busang, the index dropped another 2.7% and the portfolio increased by 0.2%.
We also estimate the model for each portfolio while including a dummy variable for event windows
of various lengths.  The results presented in Table 3 show that in all cases except the (-1,1) window for the 59
firm portfolio the event dummy is significantly different from zero.  The returns are more negative for the
Vancouver index in each case.  Given that the Vancouver Index includes non-gold stocks, this result may
seem surprising.  The Bre-X fraud likely lowered confidence in junior resource stocks generally, however. 
Moreover, the index includes many tiny junior mining companies that had to be left out of our 59 firm
portfolio because of lack of data.  And it is larger, more established  firms that apparently are more sensitive
to gold prices (Tufano, 1998).  Taken together, our results suggest that the Vancouver index is less gold-price
sensitive than our 59 firm portfolio but at the same time is more damaged by the confidence-reducing effects
of the Bre-X fraud.9
As a final step we break our 59 firm portfolio down according to size and location of reserves. 
Junior mining firms may well have been more dramatically affected by the Bre-X fiasco because their market
value is mainly a reflection of the probability of finding a large deposit.  The larger firms with proven
reserves and producing properties have a large portion of their value backed by known assets.  In general the
results shown in Table 4 indicate that the smaller firms, whether measured by ounces of production or levels
of gold reserves, experience more negative effects as a result of the Bre-X fiasco for the immediate window
surrounding the event.
In all cases, regardless of the size measure, the returns are significantly more negative for the
portfolio of smaller firms for the (0,1) event window.  However, as the event window widens the differences
between small and large firm effects become insignificant for (-1,1) and (-3,3).  At the (-5,5) window, firms
with production less than 100,000 ounces or reserves below 5,000,000 ounces again show significantly more
negative effects than larger firms.  But, if the cutoff is drawn at any positive level of production or any
positive level of proven reserves,  the larger firms appear to be the ones harder hit, which is opposite to out
priors.  This implies a pivotal role for the 28 firms with reserves greater than zero but below 5,000,000
ounces and the 14 firms with production greater than zero but less than 100,000 ounces.  Overall, we have
quite strong evidence that news of the Bre-X fraud initially affected small firms more than large firms but
little evidence that the differential effects persist as the window is widened.  There is also consistency in the
findings for the (0,1) and (-5,5) windows only when minimum production and reserve cutoffs are imposed.  It
may be added that the consistent pattern with the minimum 5,000,000 ounce reserve level is maintained if we
re-calculate our portfolios on a value-weighted basis.
We had expected that firms with reserves located in LDCs outside of the Australia, Canada, Europe,
and the United States would be influenced more by the Bre-X scandal.  In general, mines in these areas are
less accessible to investors and are less likely to be located in areas where previous mining and exploration
has or is currently taking place.  This makes it more difficult for investors to evaluate the deposits and check10
the reliability of the claims made by the mine owners.  In addition, the Bre-X experience also made it clear
that, even if the resources claimed were present, investors would have a difficult time protecting their
investments in countries without well-established rules governing property rights.  While the results do
indicate that firms with assets outside Australia, Europe, and North America have significantly higher
negative returns for the (0,1) event windows the opposite is true at the (-5,5) window).   The only case in
which the reversal does not occur is when a minimum production threshold of 100,000 ounces is imposed --
as here the difference at the (-5,5) window is not statistically significant.  Nevertheless, the apparent
contradictions between the results for the (0,1) and (-5,5) windows mean that we cannot convincingly
establish that firms with resources in LDCs were affected more by the Bre–X events.  To the extent that such
a phenomenon is present at all in our data, it is limited only to the initial (0,1) effects.
The empirical findings show that the events associated with Bre-X had significant effects, in both a
statistical and economic sense, on the value of firms involved in gold exploration and mining.  Our results
also indicate that smaller firms may have been hit harder than larger firms.  There is less  support for more
adverse effects on firms with assets located outside Australia, Europe, and North America as the differential
effects tend to reverse with a longer event window.  We should acknowledge, however, that most smaller
firms with primarily foreign claims -- and the entire group of junior firms that had rushed to Indonesia in
1997 -- are not included in our analysis due to lack of financial data.  A more detailed study of the large
collection of small junior mining firms located primarily on the Vancouver Stock Exchange would be needed
to fully address the geographical location issues.
4.  Conclusion
During the spring of 1997, Bre-X’s failure destroyed nearly 6 billion Canadian dollars in paper
wealth.  However, the losses incurred by Bre-X shareholders proved to be just the tip of the iceberg.  Our
event study suggests that the Bre-X scandal triggered a collapse in confidence in the whole mining sector,
with smaller, exploration-type companies being hit particularly badly.  Perceptions, and sector valuations,11
plummeted almost overnight and financing possibilities dried up in the wake of the Bre-X fraud.  The
collapse of the junior mining stocks serves as a reminder that a whole sector can be brought down by a single,
precipitating event.  Investor confidence is especially important in asset markets that rely heavily on uncertain
future events.  Fraud and misinformation in one instance leads investors to re-evaluate the quality of the
information provided by similar firms.  In markets where reputation plays a critical role in assessing the
quality of information, such events often lead investors to assume the worst for the remaining firms as well.12
Footnotes
* The authors are grateful to Charles Hu, Pierre Siklos and an anonymous referee for helpful comments
and suggestions.
1. While Bre-X was listed on the Toronto, NASDAQ, Montreal and Alberta stock exchanges, neither
Bre-X nor its ?sister? companies Bresea and Bro-X traded on the Vancouver exchange.  Therefore
the drop in the Vancouver index reflects only the declining fortunes of companies unaffiliated with
Bre-X.
2. The seemingly-vast size of the Busang find sparked a vicious bidding war involving not only
Freeport but also fellow major mining companies Barrick and Place Dome plus various competing
Indonesian interests (Danielson and Whyte, 1997; Francis, 1997).
3. While favorable drill results showed strong gold mineralization in the holes tested by Arequipa, mine
development requires proof that the gold mineralization is sufficiently widespread and consistent to
make production profitable.  A feasibility study, usually requiring many months to complete,
determines whether the deposit can be the basis for a viable mine and only after this can any
determination be made as to whether there are ?proven? or ?minable? reserves on the property. 
Up until this point, the actual value of the deposit remains uncertain.
4. On June 8, 1998, the Mining Standards Task Force of the Toronto Stock Exchange (where Bre-X
had been listed) and the Ontario Securities Commission proposed new stricter disclosure rules for
mining companies.  Whyte (1998, p.1) characterizes the task force’s interim report as “as a response
to the plunge in investor confidence that followed the Bre-X Minerals scandal in 1997.”
5. To be included in our sample, each mining firm had to have returns data for at least two-thirds of the
days in the estimation period.  Our data comes both Canadian and U.S. exchanges that are subject to
different exchange holidays.  If the U.S. exchanges are open and the Canadian exchanges are closed,
then the Canadian firms receive a missing value on that date.  If the Canadian exchanges are open13
and the U.S. exchanges are closed, then the returns on the Canadian firms are added to the next
trading day’s returns.  All results are very similar if we use the multifactor market model without the
Dimson adjustment.
6.  We use the S&P 500 as a benchmark instead of the Vancouver Composite Index or the
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300 Index.  The Vancouver Index is already used as a
dependent variable.  The broader-based TSE 300 is problematic because Bre-X is actually
a component of this index during our sample period.  Use of the TSE 300 would
necessitate subtracting out the effects of the Bre-X price changes for each day of our
sample (while correcting for daily changes in Bre-X’s index weighting).  For returns
measured in Canadian dollars, the S&P 500 potentially introduces a problem of exchange
rate risk between Canadian and U.S. markets, however.  In order to address this concern
we have re-estimated the model for the Vancouver Index using the larger-capitalization
TSE 35 Index -- that did not include Bre-X -- in place of the S&P 500 as our market
portfolio.  Due to data limitations we were only able to estimate the model over a shorter
(-110, 110) window.  But the results with the TSE 35 (available from the authors upon
request) are very similar to those reported here for the longer (-140, 140) window with
the S&P 500.
7. All the dates used here are obtained from Danielson and Whyte (1997), Francis (1997),
and the Wall Street Journal.  All three sources give identical dates for each of the major
events considered in our analysis.
8. All results reported in this paper are for an equally-weighted 59 firm portfolio that
attempts to capture the effects on the smaller firms in the industry.  If we convert our14
portfolio to a value-weighted index, we find negative Bre-X effects similar to those shown
in Tables 2 and 3 below.  Value-weighting is less appropriate for our purposes, however,
as the portfolio returns become dominated by a small number of relatively large firms. 
(Comparative results for a value-weighted portfolio are available from the authors upon
request.)15
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Size and Geographic Information for Portfolio Firms
  1996 gold     1996 proven       % Reserves/Assets
    ounces     and probable         located in
   produced         reserves            LDCs
AGNICO EAGLE MINES     159,558           987,000             0.00%
ALTA GOLD       49,486        1,045,056             0.00%
AMAX GOLD     210,880        6,408,000             0.00%
ANGLO SWISS INDUSTRIES                0                      0             3.77%
ARMISTICE RESOURCES                0                      0             0.00%
ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS LTD     860,384      24,200,000         100.00%
BARRICK GOLD CORP  3,149,000      51,117,000             0.00%
BATTLE MOUNTAIN     914,900      10,600,000           11.93%
BRUSH CREEK                0                      0             0.00%
CALEDONIA       31,137           514,431             0.00%
CAMBIOR     502,065        4,251,050             0.00%
CAMPBELL RESOURCES CORP     124,800           659,500           49.61%
CANARC RESOURCE CORP                0                      0           53.67%
CANYON RESOURCES CORP         6,724           635,000             0.00%
CASMYN CORP                0        1,020,322         100.00%
COEUR D'ALENE MINES CORP      214,130        3,396,000             0.00%
CONSOL. NEVADA GOLD MINES        45,271           597,722             0.00%
CORAL GOLD CORP                 0                      0             0.00%
CUSAC GOLD CORP        21,905             40,000             0.00%
DAKOTA MINING CORP        76,932           337,907             0.00%
ECHO BAY MINES      768,900        8,573,000             0.00%
FISCHER WATT        16,601             18,281             0.00%
FRANKLIN CONSOL. MINING                 0             52,510             0.00%
FREEPORT-MCMORAN   1,695,200      55,300,000         100.00%
GETCHELL GOLD CORP      171,343        4,400,000             0.00%
GLAMIS GOLD CORP      121,591        2,453,705             0.00%
GOLD CORPORATION INC      130,572        1,487,000             0.00%
GOLD RESERVE INC                 0                      0           40.72%
GOLDEN GOOSE RESOURCES                  0                      0             0.00%
GOLDEN KNIGHT        30,416                      0           76.82%
GOLDEN STAR RESOURCES INC        76,485        2,273,612             0.00%
GREAT CENTRAL MINES LTD          436,209        4,868,000         100.00%
GREENSTONE RESOURCES LTD           31,068        2,854,000           34.51%
HANOVER GOLD                 0                      0             0.00%
HECLA MINING CORP        169,376           787,249             0.00%
HERITAGE AMERICAN RESOURCES                 0                      0             0.00%
HIGHWOOD RESOURCES                       0                      0             0.00%
HOMESTAKE MINING   1,968,000      28,368,972             0.00%
INTL. PRECIOUS MINERALS CORP                 0                      0             0.00%
KINROSS GOLD CORP      524,795        4,449,000           12.88%
LEVON RESOURCES LTD                 0                      0             0.00%
LIHIR GOLD                 0      14,600,000         100.00%
MERIDIAN GOLD      202,000        1,419,000             0.00%
METALLICA RESOURCES INC                 0        1,496,000             0.00%
MIRAMAR MINING CORP      111,021        5,092,404             0.00%MISTY MOUNTAIN GOLD LTD                 0                      0             0.00%Table 1 (contd.)
MK GOLD CORP        53,945           138,000             0.00%
NEWMONT GOLD CORP   2,280,000      37,100,000           29.65%
NORTH LILY MINING CORP                 0                      0           53.21%
NORTHGATE EXPLORATION LTD          1,100                      0             0.98%
PEGASUS GOLD      497,300        7,829,000             0.00%
PLACER DOME INC   1,914,000      26,518,000           38.36%
QSR LIMITED                 0                      0             0.00%
ROYAL OAK MINES      389,203        2,682,000             0.00%
SILVERADO GOLD MINES LTD                 0                      0             0.00%
SISKON GOLD CORP          9,561           445,844             0.00%
TVX GOLD INC      424,500        5,370,000             0.00%
VENGOLD                 0           832,131         100.00%
VISTA GOLD        89,381        2,200,000             0.00%
Notes:    All information comes from Annual Reports and/or 10-K reports.  Firms may have positive production during
1996 but no proven reserves at the end of 1996 for several reasons.  The most common causes are the
exhaustion of proven reserves during the year, the sale of producing properties during the course of the year, or
minor production from reclamation activities that do not involve proven or probable reserves.  For firms
without positive reserves, we use the percentage of the firm’s total assets in LDC’s as a proxy for the firm’s 
LDC risk exposure.Table 2
Abnormal Returns Surrounding Bre-X Event Date
            59 firm           59 firm       Vancouver    Vancouver
Calendar    Event portfolio     portfolio       Index             Index
Date  Date   CARt        ARt       CARt           ARt
19970226    -20 -0.0184    -0.0184     0.0076       0.0076
19970227    -19 -0.0092     0.0092     0.0215       0.0140
19970228    -18 -0.0061     0.0031     0.0471       0.0256
19970303    -17 -0.0150    -0.0089     0.0521       0.0050
19970304    -16 -0.0113     0.0037     0.0553       0.0032
19970305    -15 -0.0071     0.0042     0.0598       0.0045
19970306    -14  0.0106     0.0177     0.0763       0.0165
19970307    -13  0.0071    -0.0035     0.0805       0.0041
19970310    -12  0.0024    -0.0047     0.0857       0.0053
19970311    -11  0.0043     0.0019     0.0845      -0.0013
19970312    -10  0.0032    -0.0011     0.0864       0.0020
19970313      -9  0.0022    -0.0009     0.0787      -0.0077
19970314      -8 -0.0048    -0.0071     0.0863       0.0076
19970317      -7  0.0023     0.0071     0.0822      -0.0042
19970318      -6  0.0069     0.0046     0.0822       0.0000
19970319      -5 -0.0073    -0.0142     0.0756      -0.0066
19970320      -4 -0.0235    -0.0162     0.0667      -0.0088
19970321      -3 -0.0249    -0.0014     0.0508      -0.0159
19970324      -2 -0.0390    -0.0141     0.0382      -0.0126
19970325      -1 -0.0243     0.0147     0.0447       0.0065
19970326       0 -0.0321    -0.0077    -0.0153      -0.0600
19970327       1 -0.0734    -0.0413    -0.0587      -0.0433
19970331       2 -0.0836    -0.0102    -0.0729      -0.0142
19970401       3 -0.0901    -0.0065    -0.0479       0.0249
19970402       4 -0.0743     0.0157    -0.0364       0.0115
19970403       5 -0.0836    -0.0093    -0.0398      -0.0034
19970404       6 -0.0770     0.0066    -0.0388       0.0010
19970407       7 -0.0868    -0.0098    -0.0597      -0.0209
19970408       8 -0.0925    -0.0057    -0.0790      -0.0192
19970409       9 -0.0939    -0.0014    -0.1025      -0.0236
19970410     10 -0.0978    -0.0040    -0.0893       0.0133
19970411     11 -0.1118    -0.0139    -0.0964      -0.0071
19970414     12 -0.1104     0.0014    -0.1183      -0.0219
19970415     13 -0.1145    -0.0041    -0.1114       0.0069
19970416     14 -0.1209    -0.0064    -0.1182      -0.0068
19970417     15 -0.1300    -0.0091    -0.1023       0.0159
19970418     16 -0.1248     0.0052    -0.0919       0.0104
19970421     17 -0.1351    -0.0103    -0.1000      -0.0081
19970422     18 -0.1509    -0.0158    -0.1140      -0.0141
19970423     19 -0.1589    -0.0080    -0.1141      -0.0001
19970424     20 -0.1870    -0.0281    -0.1156      -0.0015
Notes: ARt is the abnormal return on day t from the estimation of the multifactor market model. This represents the
abnormal change on a given day.  CARt is the cumulative abnormal return up to day t. This represents the sum
of all the individual daily abnormal returns up to and including a given day.Table 3
Event Dummies for Various Bre-X Event Windows
    Dummy Coefficients      Dummy Coefficients
Event Window        59 Firm Portfolio           Vancouver Index










Notes: The dummy coefficient represents the average daily abnormal returns. To calculate the cumulative abnormal
return over the entire period, one needs to multiply the coefficient estimate by the number of days in the event
window.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
*  denotes significance at the 10% level.
** denotes significance at the 5% level.
*** denotes significance at the 1% level.Table 4
Event Dummies for Size and Geographic Portfolios
                         Event Window
Sample N (0,1) (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5)
Firms without 18 -0.0437 -0.0169 -0.0153 -0.0085
proven reserves (2.09)**(0.99) (1.37) (0.94)
Firms with  41 -0.0190 -0.0103 -0.0080 -0.0092
proven reserves (1.96)**(1.30) (1.54) (2.21)**
F-statistic (3.66)**(1.18) (1.89) (2.66)*
Firms without 21 -0.0389 -0.0168 -0.0148 -0.0072
1996 production (2.00)**(1.06) (1.42) (0.86)
Firms with 38 -0.0198 -0.0099 -0.0076 -0.0099
1996 production (2.09)**(1.28) (1.49) (2.44)
F-statistic (3.73)**(1.22) (1.87) (3.10)**
Firms with 46 -0.0286 -0.0129 -0.0112 -0.0097
1996 reserves (2.56)*** (1.49) (1.86)* (2.00)**
< 5,000,000 oz
Firms with 13 -0.0184 -0.0096 -0.0067 -0.0067
1996 reserves (1.88)* (1.21) (1.29) (1.58)
> 5,000,000 oz
F-statistic (3.79)**(1.27) (1.94) (2.41)*
Firms with 35 -0.0314 -0.0134 -0.0130 -0.0101
1996 production (2.27)**(1.19) (1.78)* (1.69)*
< 100,000 oz
Firms with 24 -0.0192 -0.0103 -0.0063 -0.0075
1996 production (2.13)**(1.41) (1.30) (1.93)*
> 100,000 oz
F-statistic (3.90)**(1.36) (1.93) (2.64)*Table 4 (contd.)
Firms with 18 -0.0290 -0.093 -0.0081 -0.0068
assets in LDCs (1.56) (0.62) (0.82) (0.85)
Firms with no 41 -0.0254 -0.0132 -0.0110 -0.0098
assets in LDCs (2.58)**(1.64)* (2.08)**(2.30)**
F-statistic (3.80)**(1.36) (2.20) (2.70)*
Firms with 12 -0.0372 -0.0105 -0.0089 -0.0071
1996 reserves (1.27) (0.44) (0.57) (0.56)
< 5,000,000 oz
and LDCs
Firms with 34 -0.0266 -0.0136 -0.0118 -0.0103
1996 reserves (2.47)* (1.55) (2.04) (2.22)
< 5,000,000 oz
and no LDCs
F-statistic (3.49)**(1.22) (2.11) (2.49)*
Firms with 10 -0.0391 -0.0098 -0.0121 -0.0076
1996 production (1.04) (0.32) (0.60) (0.47)
<100,000 oz
and LDCs
Firms with 25 -0.0296 -0.0145 -0.0133 -0.0107
1996 production (2.24)**(1.35) (1.88)* (1.88)*
<100,000 oz
and no LDCs
F-statistic (2.83)* (0.93) (1.84) (1.80)
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses.  The F-statistic is for the cross equation restriction that the dummy coefficients
are equal for the two groups.
* denotes significance at the 10% level.
** denotes significance at the 5% level.
*** denotes significance at the 1% level.